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Acting for the good of the group: The role of social identity and rational 
calculation motives 
Keith Leas and Daysha Jackson 
Jay Jackson 
Psychology 
Indiana University-Purdue University Fort yYayne 
Individuals must often choose to cooperate with others to maximize a group 
outcome or act in a way that maximizes personal incentives. When each individual in 
a group benefits more by defecting than cooperating, the situation is a social 
dilemma. Traditional theories of choice behavior in social dilemmas have assumed 
that people's behavior is individualistic, selfish, and rational in the sense of 
maximizing personal outcomes. More recent theories have emphasized group 
identification motives and suggest that people often sacrifice personal gains for the 
good of the larger group. We conducted an experiment that examined both 
individualistic and collective motives simultaneously. We predicted that participants 
in a superordinate condition (common group membership emphasized) would be 
more cooperative than those in an individualistic condition (individuality 
emphasized) or a subgroup condition (two distinct groups emphasized). We further 
predicted that this basic effect would be mediated by social identification (stronger in 
the collective condition) and rational calculation (e.g., less fear of being taken 
advantage of in the collective condition) motives. Participants were 140 elementary 
psychology students. The experimental design was a 3 (collective, subgroup, or 
individualistic condition) x 2 (academic major or political affiliation as basis for 
group membership) factorial. In each experimental session, six participants were 
seated in isolated cubicles. Each was allocated $5 and then had to privately and 
irrevocably decide to either GIVE or KEEP the endowment. It was made clear that 
money given would not be returned, but if $20 or more was collected in total all six 
would receive a $10 bonus (whether or not they personally gave). Several measures 
were administered, including group identification and rational calculation estimates. 
Cooperation was significantly greater in the collective condition compared to the 
individualistic or subgroup conditions. As predicted, participants in the collective 
condition expressed greater group identification, were less fearful of losing their 
endowment, and were less concerned with maximizing selfish interests. These 
motivational items, in tum, predicted rates of cooperation. Suggestions for the 
theoretical integration of social identity and rational calculation approaches are 
discussed. 
